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What is Legal Luck?  
 
Subject to some qualifications (discussed in the closing section), “legal 
luck” obtains where one’s legal status – such as legal rights, obligations, 
liabilities, and culpability – turns on facts not under one’s control 
(Enoch 2008: 28).1 A full account of “control” is beyond our scope but 
basically the idea is that we are often in control of conduct and of 
outcomes that we bring about when acting in our capacity as practical 
agents.  
 
The two instances of legal luck most explored in the literature critical of 
legal luck involve the tort of negligence (Feinberg 1962; Waldron 1995; 
Schroeder 1997) and the criminal law of attempts (Feinberg 1962; Davis 
1986; Lewis 1989; Kessler 1994; Kadish 1994; Alexander 1994).  
 
The classic scenario for exploring luck in negligence involves two 
equally negligent drivers. While both are driving carelessly, one 
accidently hits a pedestrian who, as luck would have it, happens to cross 
the road at that exact movement, while the other driver hits no one. It is 
stipulated that while failing to pay attention to the road was within the 
control of both drivers, the consequences of their respective failures to 
do so were not. In terms of what was under the drivers’ control, it was 
similarly a matter of luck whether anyone crossed the road at the same 
moment of their carelessness. Now, although the two drivers are alike 
with regards to what is within their control, tort law judges them very 
differently.  The unlucky driver is held liable for hitting a pedestrian 
while the second driver – who was equally negligent yet fortunately hit 
no one – is not liable at all. To recover damages in negligence, it is not 
enough to prove that the defendant’s negligent behaviour put one at 
unreasonable risk of harm; the law also requires that the plaintiff prove 
that the defendant’s risky conduct actually harmed one. Accordingly, the 
stark difference in the legal statuses of the two drivers turns on facts 
similarly outside of their control, entailing that legal liability for 
negligence can turn on luck.     
 
On to the law of criminal attempts. In many jurisdictions, punishment 
for a completed crime is more severe than it is for a failed attempt at 
completing the same crime. And whether an attempt is successful often 
turns, at least to a degree, on facts beyond one’s control. For example, if 
a sudden gale serendipitously alters the trajectory of an assassin’s bullet 																																																								
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thereby saving the target’s life, the would-be assassin is guilty of 
attempted murder, even though the charge would have been full-fledged 
murder but for the unexpected gust of wind. Accordingly, differences in 
legal culpability and punishment between the successful and the 
unsuccessful criminal may turn on facts similarly beyond their control, 
thereby grounding the extent of criminal culpability in luck.   
 
Having detailed two of the literature’s specific examples of legal luck, 
there are three general types of legal luck. Thomas Nagel offers a 
taxonomy of morally salient types of luck (Nagel 1993). Although 
Nagel is focused on “moral luck” (a concept explained below), his 
categories are helpful for conceptualizing different types of legal luck. 
Most prominent in the literature on legal luck is “resultant luck,”2 which 
involves legal liability for certain uncontrolled outcomes of one’s 
conduct. Another form of luck is “circumstantial,” which is luck in the 
circumstances of conduct where those circumstances are both beyond 
one’s control as well as influence what one does. Accordingly, 
circumstantial legal luck involves legal status turning on circumstances 
rather than on agency. Nagel also explores what is known as 
“constitutive luck.” Often our actions are influenced by our character 
traits, dispositions, capacities, talents, and natural inclinations, none of 
which are subject to our control, at least not readily, and are often 
moulded by forces also largely beyond our control, such as our genes 
and the circumstances of our upbringing. Constitutive legal luck 
involves legal status turning on facts arising out of such constitutive 
features.   
 
Regardless of the type of legal luck involved, the literature is mostly 
myopic to the variance in degrees in legal luck. Much of the literature on 
luck and the law comes from moral philosophy, which tends to view law 
as a reservoir of examples of moral luck, often glossing over the legal 
details. Yet ignoring the law’s nuances might result in an inflated 
conception of the extent of legal luck.  
 
Legal luck admits degrees. Control is a matter of degree – one can have 
more or less control over her actions and their outcomes. And given that 
legal luck involves legal status turning on facts beyond one’s control, it 
follows that one’s legal status may involve more or less legal luck based 
on the given level of one’s control over the relevant facts, such as the 
extent to which one can raise or reduce the probability of an occurrence.   
 
As reflected in the paradigmatic examples of legal luck presented above, 
the type of legal luck most often explored is the resultant luck found in 
legal causation. Causation in law is normally predicated on a 
conjunction of two tests. Typically, first comes what is known as the 
“but for test” which asks whether X would have transpired but for the 
defendant’s conduct. If the answer is “no,” then the defendant’s conduct 
did not – as a matter of law – cause X.  If, however, the answer is “yes,” 
then the defendant’s conduct is what lawyers call a “factual cause” of X.  
Yet in order to prove as a matter of law that the defendant caused X, the 
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plaintiff must also establish that the defendant’s conduct was a 
“proximate cause” of X.   
 
The tests for proximate causation are several and still evolving, and may 
vary in nuance among different branches of the law. Yet they all 
function to pick out from the vast chains of factual causes leading up to 
X those causes that warrant legal liability. Presently the most common 
test for determining proximate causation is the “reasonable 
foreseeability” test, which asks whether a reasonable person under 
similar circumstances would have foreseen X as a likely outcome of said 
conduct. Other tests turn on whether an outcome is too “remote” or 
“accidental” to count as legally caused by the defendant’s conduct.   
 
Accordingly, the law of causation removes from the scope of liability 
most instances of potential resultant legal luck. As a matter of factual 
causation, our legally wrongful (or otherwise liability grounding) 
conduct invariably contributes to numerous causal chains leading to any 
number of harmful or otherwise destructive outcomes – most of which 
too remote to imagine let alone control. Were we liable for the 
unforeseeable or remote factual outcomes of our legal wrongs, the extent 
of luck’s role in determining our liability would have been crushing. 
Thankfully liability does not extend to all such outcomes.  
 
Important for our purposes is that tests such as the foreseeability test 
have a measure of control built into them. Ability to foresee an outcome 
provides the opportunity not only to learn of the likelihood of the 
outcome but often also thereby provides the opportunity to take action to 
avoid that outcome or, at least, to reduce the probability of it occurring, 
thereby providing for a measure of control over that outcome. This 
suggests that the luck inherent in legal causation involves a relatively 
lower degree of resultant luck than may seem at first blush. Especially 
given that most people have a predictive capacity approximating what 
the courts normally determine as “reasonable foreseeability.” 
Accordingly, by limiting liability to what we can reasonably foresee the 
law at least often significantly diminishes luck’s role in determining 
liability. 
 
Another often discussed instance of legal luck involves the constitutive 
luck found in tort law’s “reasonable person standard.” Legal negligence 
involves a breach of a duty of care which then causes harm to the person 
to whom that duty was owed. Courts normally construe “care” as what a 
reasonable person would have done under the same circumstances. 
Thus, if one causes (foreseeable) harm to a person to whom one owes a 
duty of care, one is normally liable for the harm, provided that one 
caused it while acting unreasonably.   
 
Now, what of people whose capacities and abilities fall short of the 
capacities and abilities of the “reasonable person,” making it much 
harder or even nearly impossible for them to meet the law’s standard of 
conduct? Are such people liable for harms they cause while acting 
“unreasonably”? But for a handful of exceptions, such as children and 
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people with physical disabilities, the answer is “yes.” The reasonable- 
person standard is what the law calls an “objective standard,” applying 
to everyone regardless of idiosyncrasies. In the words of Oliver Wendell 
Holmes:    
 
“If, for instance, a man is born hasty and awkward, is always 
having accidents and hurting himself or his neighbours, no doubt 
his congenital defects will be allowed for in the courts of Heaven, 
but his slips are no less troublesome to his neighbours than if they 
sprang from guilty neglect. His neighbours accordingly require 
him, at his proper peril, to come up to their standard, and the 
courts which they establish decline to take his personal equation 
into account.”                     
(Holmes 1881: 86-87) 
 
One could scarcely imagine a starker rendition of a rather strict version 
of constitutive legal luck.  
 
Then again, like in the case of legal causation, here too the literature at 
times gives an exaggerated impression of the extent of legal luck. When 
determining the contours of the reasonable person’s reasonableness 
courts typically take a variety of considerations into account, including 
not only social policy and judges’ objectives for how people should 
behave, but also social custom and approximations of the actual abilities 
and limitations of the citizenry. Rarely does the law adopt a standard so 
aspirational that most people would find it highly difficult let alone 
nearly impossible to follow. As described in a leading treatise, the 
reasonable person “… has not the courage of Achilles, the wisdom of 
Ulysses or the strength of Hercules ...” (Winfield & Jolowicz 2010: 93). 
 
Thus, although the reasonable person standard is normative rather than 
sociological, frequently it is designed to approximate – at least partially 
– the abilities of the common person. This is quaintly reflected in a  
classic description of the reasonable person as “[t]he man on the 
Clapham omnibus … The man who takes the magazines at home, and in 
the evening pushes the lawn mower in his shirt sleeves...” (Hall v 
Brooklands Auto Racing Club 1933). 
 
Accordingly, while the law of negligence involves the potential for 
rather harsh constitutive legal luck, in practice such luck mostly arises in 
the fringe cases of people lacking the full capacities ascribed to the 
reasonable person. 
 
At times, however, law does wholeheartedly adopt higher degrees of 
legal luck. An example is the “thin skull” exception to the rule of 
proximate causation, according to which liability may attach to those 
who cause others personal injury even if the extent of the injury was not 
reasonably foreseeable. This doctrine applies if the (extra) unforeseen 
harm resulted from a concealed frailty in the victim. The classic 
example is of a victim with a latent medical condition – such as 
haemophilia – suffering serious injury as the result of a minor battery. 
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Given that such (extra) harm is considered too remote to reasonably 
foresee, causing it is largely beyond one’s control. This is because 
control has epistemic conditions as well as metaphysical ones, and the 
foreseeability test speaks to the former. Holding one liable under such 
circumstances for unforeseeable harms involves, therefore, a significant 
measure of resultant legal luck.  
 
Regimes of “strict liability” also involve a high level of legal luck.  
Strict liability is liability for what one does or causes faultlessly. In other 
words, it is liability for conduct and outcomes that may have been 
unreasonable to avoid or prevent. For instance, the doctrine of 
“respondent superior” holds faultless employers liable for harms 
resulting from their employees’ negligence when performed within the 
scope of the employment. “Product liability” is another example. In 
many jurisdictions, manufacturers are liable for harms caused by a 
defect in their product, even when faultless in making the product 
defective. The tort of trespass to land also turns on strict liability, 
imposing liability even on unintentional trespassers who took all 
reasonably available precautions to avoid encroaching upon another’s 
property. 
 
Now that we have a sense of what legal luck is, we turn to the matter of 
its justification.         
 
What is Moral Luck? 
 
The literature on legal luck is often intertwined with the philosophical 
literature on “moral luck,” a term referring to luck’s putative role in 
determining a person’s moral record, including blameworthiness, 
praiseworthiness, accountability, and culpability (Statman 1993: 1-35; 
Nelkin 2013). In fact, the notion of legal luck is very much the legal 
corollary of moral luck. Moral luck negates what is known as the 
“control principle,” under which what goes on a person’s moral record is 
conditioned on what is under that person’s control. Accordingly, one is 
not appropriately subject to moral assessment for that which is beyond 
her control. Moral luck is therefore at odds with the control principle. 
Now, whether there really is moral luck is a contested matter. For every 
supporter of moral luck there are at least as many detractors. Luckily, 
litigating the matter is not central to understanding legal luck. What is 
important for our purposes are the implications of whether or not moral 
luck exists on the justification of legal luck. To which we turn next. 
 
Moral Luck and Legal Luck  
 
For those accepting the existence of moral luck there appears nothing 
problematic in legal luck per se. This remains the case even when one’s 
legal status ought to somehow track one’s moral record. Because if one 
accepts moral luck, then the mere fact that one’s legal status is not fully 
sensitive to what is under one’s control does not necessarily entail that 
the law does not track one’s moral record. In fact, as explained below, 
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accepting moral luck may yield an argument in favour of instances of 
legal luck.      
 
In contrast, for those denying the existence of moral luck – thereby 
holding the view that a person’s moral record is necessarily grounded in 
control – legal luck raises potential moral concerns. These arise in cases 
in which one’s legal status ought to somehow track one’s moral record. 
Because given that legal luck entails legal status divorced (at least to an 
extent) from control, and given the premise that control grounds moral 
record, it follows that legal luck involves legal status divorced (at least 
to an extent) from moral record.   
 
As explored below, whether one’s legal status ought to somehow track 
one’s moral record is a normative question touching on the moral 
grounds of law. In this section, it's assumed that there are some instances 
of legal status in which moral record ought to have such a role. Notice 
that the locution “somehow track one’s moral record” is purposely 
vague. One’s legal status in relation to Y may track one’s moral record 
in relation to Y in more than one way: explicitly turning on moral 
record; turning on the same facts that ground moral record; 
coincidentally corresponding to moral record; and so on. For our 
purposes, it is enough that some such tracking relation ought to obtain to 
raise concerns with legal luck. 
 
Returning to the example of the two drivers, in the eyes of those 
rejecting resultant moral luck the unlucky driver is not blameworthy or 
culpable for the outcomes of his driving, as they are outside of his 
control. Now, if in such cases one’s legal liability for the outcomes of 
one’s conduct ought to track one’s moral record vis-à-vis those 
outcomes, then the luck inherent to legal causation in such cases seems 
wrongful, because such luck involves legal liability divorced from moral 
record.  
 
Yet notice that even for hardened devotees of the control principle, the 
measure of wrongness of different instances of legal luck may differ. 
Under the control principle – in those cases where one’s legal status 
ought to somehow track one’s moral record – more legal luck is worse 
than less. Given that control and, therefore, luck come in degrees, and 
given that moral record turns on control, it follows that cases of less 
legal luck involve more control and, therefore, more sensitivity to moral 
record than cases of more legal luck involving less control. Thus, 
assuming the control principle and rejecting moral luck, all else being 
equal, legal doctrines of strict liability are typically morally worse than 
doctrines such as legal causation and negligence – at least when legal 
status ought to track moral record. 
 
Is Legal Luck Pro Tanto Wrong?    
 
David Enoch argues that for those rejecting moral luck any instance of 
legal luck is pro tanto wrong (Enoch 2008:31-8). Here is why. Legal 
luck entails legal status wholly or partially divorced from control. 
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Assuming that moral record is grounded in control, and further 
assuming that one’s moral record in relation to certain facts is always 
relevant for what one’s legal status ought to be in relation to those facts, 
it follows that legal luck is always pro tanto wrongful. This does not 
entail that all cases of legal luck are, all things considered, wrong, but 
does entail that there is always some reason counting against legal luck. 
Whether any instance of legal luck is all things considered wrongful 
turns also on various other potentially competing reasons germane to the 
particular case and to the type of legal status at hand.   
 
Key to Enoch’s argument is that one’s moral record vis-à-vis Y is always 
a reason for what one’s legal status ought to be vis-à-vis Y.  As Enoch 
writes: 
 
“[I]t just seems basically unfair to have one’s interests influenced 
profoundly by the law in ways that have nothing to do with one’s 
(relevant) moral status … The way the law treats me (with regard 
to a certain incident, or case, or action, or whatever) should be 
sensitive, it seems to me, to what my moral status is (with regard 
to that incident, case, action, or whatever)” (Enoch 2008: 36-7). 
 
For Enoch’s argument to work, all legal luck must impact its subjects. 
And for his argument to escape the charge of negligibility that impact 
must often be significant, otherwise other considerations for and against 
legal luck would regularly drown out Enoch’s pro tanto reasons.   
 
Yet not all possible instances of one’s legal status impact one’s interests 
– for example, culpability under an unenforceable and little-known law 
or a legal entitlement that is more bother pursuing than it’s worth. And 
whether there is something specific to the type of legal statuses involved 
in cases of legal luck necessarily impacting one’s interests is unclear. 
What is clear is that the definition of legal luck as legal status turning on 
facts beyond one’s control does not establish such a necessary relation 
between legal luck and interests. And to make his argument Enoch must 
establish such a connection.  
 
Thus, as it stands, the view that there is an ever-present reason counting 
against any instance of legal luck proves too broad. That said, even if 
legal luck’s obliviousness to moral record does not always count against 
it, obviously often it does. As reflected in much of the literature 
referenced above, legally caused deprivation not grounded in fault often 
seems deeply unfair.     
 
Legal Luck and Agency: Is Legal Luck Pro Tanto Justified?     
 
Counting in favour of accepting luck as a part of the moral landscape is 
the fact that the control principle seems to entail a diminished human 
agency (Nagel 1993: 66; Urban-Walker 1993: 239-247; Williams 1993; 
Statman 2014: 103-107). If true, this line raised by proponents of the 
view that moral luck exists may help bolster an argument in favour of 
certain instances of legal luck.   
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As stipulated at the outset, controlled action is the type of action that one 
performs as an agent. The view that moral record turns on control is 
based on the view that agency grounds moral record, that is, we are only 
blameworthy, praiseworthy, or culpable for that which we do or bring 
about as agents. Now people are part of a complex causal web, 
inhabiting a world governed by the natural laws of cause and effect. 
Thus, much of what we appear to do or bring about is in fact not under 
our control, be it wholly or partially, and, therefore, does not seem to 
involve our agency, at least not entirely. Thus, purifying moral record of 
luck threatens shrinking agency to an “extensionless point” (Nagel 
1993: 66). Even our will and intentions – seemingly inhabiting agency’s 
inner citadel – are not always entirely free of causal determinants 
(Feinberg 1963: 349-50). Accordingly, agency without moral luck 
seems largely inert. That is, most of what we imagine as our actions – in 
the sense that we are accountable, blameworthy, and praiseworthy for 
them – are in fact events in which our agency is affected by factors 
outside of our control, at least to a substantial degree. This entails that 
while our lives are ours in the sense that we live them, they are far less 
ours in the sense of active practical agents.  
 
Relatedly, purifying agency from luck entails a highly contracted and 
faded self. Bernard Williams puts the point well:  
 
“One’s history as an agent is a web in which anything that is the 
product of the will is surrounded and held up and partly formed 
by things that are not, in such a way that reflection can go only in 
one of two directions: either in the direction of saying that 
responsible agency is a fairly superficial concept, which has a 
limited use in harmonizing what happens, or else that it is not a 
superficial concept, but that it cannot ultimately be purified – if 
one attaches importance to the sense of what one is in terms of 
what one has done and what in the world one is responsible for, 
one must accept much that makes its claim on that sense solely in 
virtue of its being actual.” (Williams 1993: 44-45).  
 
This truncated picture of the self is troubling. To use Williams’ terms, 
we do attach importance to what we are in terms of what we have done. 
We experience ourselves and give meaning to our lives as active agents. 
Accordingly, what we do as agents – our choices, failures, successes – 
and what credit and blame we deserve for them, take part in forming our 
life story and “who we are.” Purifying agency from any luck leaves us, 
therefore, with very little agency, thereby shrinking our existence as 
fully-fledged active selves as well as dissolving much of the meaning 
that we find in that existence.  
 
If these reflections are broadly correct, adopting the control principle 
and rejecting moral luck clash with rather basic conceptions and 
premises that we hold true about the nature and parameters of agency 
and the self, which, according to proponents of the idea of moral luck, 
gives reason for believing in moral luck and for rejecting the veracity of 
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the control principle. It is the fact of moral luck that enables the type of 
agency that can robustly exist in the actual world – recognizing that 
some of our conduct and some of its outcomes are ours as agents, 
thereby influencing our moral record, even though they arise out of luck 
and are fully or at least partially beyond our control. 
 
Given all this, building on Honore’s ideas on luck in tort law and 
assuming, for the sake of argument, that moral luck exists, I submit that 
moral luck’s purported role in forming agency and the self is relevant to 
the justification of legal luck. Writing on resultant luck, Honore claims 
that society’s norms allocate accountability according to the luck-
dependent outcomes of our conduct. And we are in effect forced to “bet” 
on those outcomes when we act, without certainty as to whether things 
will end up to our credit or discredit (Honore 1988: 540). Moreover, 
Honore believes that we are better off living with a luck-infused moral 
record, because although it might entail discredit for failures and 
misdeeds that we are not (at least not fully) responsible for, it also 
credits us with our many successes for which are similarly not morally 
responsible for. And, in the process, we gain a full fledge self (Honore 
1988: 542-543).  
 
How do we come to know the scope of our actions, successes, failures, 
praise, and culpability? Relatedly, how do we come to appreciate and 
live by the parameters of our agency and self? The answer is that these 
occur – to a significant degree – through the inculcation of social norms. 
Law is central to such social norms. Perhaps more than any other social 
institution it is the law that directs us on matters of accountability, 
instructing us on what we are credited with and discredited for, how far 
our culpability extends, what we deserve, and to what we are entitled 
given our conduct. The law thereby contributes to forming and to 
informing our sense of the breath of agency and of where our self begins 
and where it ends.  
 
To perform this task, the law must incorporate luck into the conditions 
of legal status, mirroring our luck-infused moral records. Were legal 
status devoid of luck – turning purely on what is within our control – the 
law would have painted a faded and inert picture of agency and 
conveyed a narrow conception of the self. Now the law of course never 
entirely mirrors moral record – nor should it. Even at the price of 
projecting a false image of the breadth of agency. My point is only that 
in incorporating luck into legal status, the law can and often does 
perform this task. And that this counts in favour of the law incorporating 
a measure of legal luck. Notice that none of this of course establishes 
that legal luck is pro tanto justified. Even assuming moral luck exists, 
legal luck neither necessarily reflects moral record nor necessarily 
captures the nature of agency.  
 
Justifying Legal Luck  
 
Having explored reasons for and against legal luck in general, we now 
turn to the justification of legal luck as it appears in specific branches of 
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the law. When reflecting on the justification of an instance of legal luck, 
the key issue is whether the law – in that instance – ought to track one’s 
relevant moral record. 
 
Let's begin with tort law. Much of the literature on luck in tort law 
attempts to vindicate legal luck, arguing that personal moral record – 
such as fault and desert – are just not part of the grounds and logic of 
tort law. Working within a Kantian paradigm, Arthur Ripstein views law 
as a systematic realization of equal freedom guaranteed by reciprocal 
(and coercive) limits. The role of tort law under this picture is to protect 
people’s reciprocal rights in their “means,” such as in their person and 
property (Ripstein 2008: 69). Oriented towards rights, tort law therefore 
typically ought to respond to violation of such rights, whether or not 
such violations spring from moral fault (Ripstein 2008 & 2016). John 
Goldberg and Benjamin Zipursky view tort law as devoted to securing 
victims of certain wrongs a legal recourse for responding to and for 
extracting a remedy from those who wronged them. Focused more on 
wrongs to victims, this goal does not turn on whether or not the 
wrongdoing, which ought to trigger a legal right of action, involved fault 
(Goldberg & Zipursky 2007; Zipursky 2008). Gregory Keating views 
accident law as ideally devoted to the fair and favourable balancing of 
liberty and personal security (Keating 2006). Pursuant to this Rawlsian 
view, tort liability ought to spring from accidental disruptions to that 
balance, whether negligent or faultless.  
 
Moreover, whether or not explicitly engaging the issues of legal and 
moral luck, there are still other accounts of the grounds of tort law that 
are also potentially hospitable to legal luck, such as the view that tort 
law ought to maximise social wealth and, accordingly, function to 
impose liability in ways that minimise the costs of accidents (Calabresi 
1970) and incentivize economically optimal conduct (Posner 1972; 
Landes & Posner 1987). Under such views, so long as torts of strict 
liability and negligence deliver economic efficiency, their incorporation 
of luck is immaterial and even desirable.     
 
Even in criminal law – wherein moral desert is undoubtedly a central 
consideration – the case against legal luck is not clear cut. The strongest 
case against incorporating legal luck in criminal punishment is 
predicated on retributive justice. Retributivism is the view that 
punishment ought to be meted out to fit people’s just deserts. That is, 
punishment should be meted out for the relevant aspects of defendants’ 
moral record. Accordingly, for those rejecting moral luck – thereby 
adopting the control principle for moral record – retributive justice 
counts against legal luck in punishment because legal luck entails 
punishment regardless of moral desert. And, were retribution the sole 
consideration animating the justness of punishment, it would follow that 
legal luck in punishment is wrong. Even those who are not retributivists 
(that is do not view desert as reason in favor of punishing) yet do view 
desert as a necessary condition for or a ‘side-constraint’ on just 
punishment (H.L.A. Hart 1968), would deem legal luck wrong when 
prescribing punishing beyond the constraints of desert. 
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Yet not everyone is a retributivist, and even among retributivists 
retribution does not necessarily stand alone among the grounds of just 
punishment. And these other grounds do not necessarily cut against 
legal luck in punishment. Thus, at least for some, just punishment is not 
necessarily incompatible with legal luck, even if we were to reject moral 
luck.    
 
For instance, removing dangerous recidivist criminals from society is a 
goal of punishment oblivious to whether or not the crime is within a 
defendant’s control (Eiskovits 2005; Kadish 1994: 685-6). Deterrence is 
another often-mentioned goal of punishment, which also does not 
necessarily count against legal luck (Lewis 1989: 55-56; Kadish 1994: 
685-687; Eiskovits 2005). For example, while attempting to deter people 
from doing what is out of their control may seem futile, sometimes 
punishing those lacking in control may serve to deter others who do 
possess the requisite control (Shavel 1990). 
 
There are still other efforts to justify legal luck in punishment (Hart 
1968; Davis 1986; Kenny 1988; Moore 1997: 192-247; Katz 2000; 
Ripstein 2009). I will mention two. Arguing noncommittedly from the 
value of fairness, David Lewis suggests lessening the sting of the luck 
inherent to the criminal law of attempts (Lewis 1989). According to 
Lewis, when attempting to commit a crime one effectively enters a 
lottery for what punishment one will face if caught and convicted – if 
successful one will face harsher punishment than if one’s attempt falls 
short. Given that only the attempt is under one’s control and given that 
whether or not one’s attempt succeeds is a matter of luck, whether or not 
one will face a harsher sentence is also a matter of luck. Yet this type of 
legal luck is putatively fair because anyone who attempts to commit a 
crime is subjected to the same lottery.  
 
Another argument in favour of different punishment for failed and 
successful attempts involves criminal law’s purported communicative 
goal (Duff 2001). Some argue that criminal punishment is and ought to 
be a vehicle of condemnation, wherein the community expresses its 
values and censure to criminals as well as to their victims and to the 
general citizenry. Arguing from the expressivist paradigm, Antony Duff 
believes it important for the law to communicate that a completed crime 
is worse than a failed attempt at the same crime, because only then does 
law communicate the added disvalue of completed crime. Equal 
punishment for successful and for failed attempts would signal that the 
law – and thereby the community – is oblivious to such added disvalue, 
such as the harm to the victims and the costs to society at large (Duff 
1990: 31-37).  
 
The Bounds of Legal Luck 
 
I close with the question with which we began: what is legal luck? 
Conceiving of legal luck as we have thus far solely in terms of “facts 
beyond one’s control affecting one’s legal status” is too expansive. 
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Numerous facts that are beyond our control impact our legal rights and 
obligations. Construing “legal luck” to encompass them all seems to 
dilute the category, losing site of the type of cases that have drawn the 
scholarly attention enumerated above. For example, the contractual right 
for payment that a lottery ticket holder has against the lotto company 
only vests once she wins the lottery, which is clearly beyond her control. 
Is hers really a case of what we have in mind when thinking of “legal 
luck”? Or, is my status as a murderer a matter of “legal luck” given that 
numerous circumstances not under my control contributed to my success 
in killing my victim? Such as, once I aimed and pulled the trigger my 
pistol did not jam or misfire, my target did not bend over to tie his 
shoelaces just as I fired, and a flock of birds did not fly by just in time to 
absorb my fire. Yet, although I may be a “lucky murderer,” am I legally 
lucky? Seems not. At least not in the sense of the literature we are trying 
to understand here. Accordingly, if we took “legal luck” to mean only 
“facts outside of one’s control affecting one’s legal status,” then given 
that most of life’s circumstances involve a measure of lack of control, it 
would follow that the category of “legal luck” is ubiquitous, including 
numerous cases that seem outside the scope of the literature on legal 
luck.  
 
This raises two related challenges. One is to better delineate the bounds 
of “legal luck,” capturing those instances of luck that have drawn 
philosophical attention and differentiating them from other less relevant 
cases of luck impacting legal status. A second challenge is normative – 
explaining whether this tighter conception of “legal luck” warrants the 
special scholarly attention it has received. Does the category of “legal 
luck,” as distinguished from other cases of luck impacting legal status 
track anything of distinct moral significance or concern, such as the 
fairness concerns explored above?   
 
Setting out to delineate the bounds of legal luck, Enoch draws a 
distinction between legal luck and what he calls “plain luck that carries 
legal implications” (hereinafter “plain luck”) (Enoch 2008: 38-44). 
According to Enoch, the “luck” in “legal luck” is internal to the law. It 
is, if you will, luck that the law itself creates. In contrast, where plain 
luck is at issue, the law is merely sensitive to non-legal circumstances 
that involve luck, thereby making the law indirectly susceptive to the 
effects of luck that already exist regardless of the law. Another way 
Enoch puts the distinction is that legal luck is luck that the law creates 
intentionally, while plain luck is luck that the law merely foresees or 
allows to have legal implications. For example, whether or not an 
attempt at X succeeds in X-ing is often a matter of resultant luck. Given 
that law draws a legal distinction – explicitly turning on the outcomes of 
actions – between the crime of X-ing and the crime of attempted X-ing, 
the law intentionally creates (in Enoch’s terms) a legal distinction 
turning on resultant luck. Or, assuming that people’s natural capacities 
and inclinations, such as intelligence, carelessness, accuracy etc., are a 
matter of constitutive luck, if the law then draws a legal distinction that 
explicitly turns on such capacities and inclinations – as in the legal 
distinction between a “reasonable person” and an “unreasonable person” 
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– the law is actively and intentionally determining legal status based on 
luck.  
 
Yet, Enoch distinction does not help us with the two challenges set out 
above. As for the normative challenge, Enoch explains that his 
distinction between legal luck and plain luck does not track any 
intrinsically morally significant difference (Enoch 2008: 53). And as for 
delineating “legal luck,” the distinction between plain luck and legal 
luck does not always comfortably fit all clear-cut cases of “legal luck.” 
Here is an example. A recent election for a seat on the Virginia State 
Legislature was ruled a tie, and, pursuant to Virginia law, a lottery 
decides the winner. I take this as a clear-cut case of luck affecting legal 
status that is not a case of what the literature on “legal luck” has in mind 
(perhaps because the Virginia law seems fair). Nevertheless, the 
Virginia example is, I think, exactly what Enoch has in mind by “legal 
luck.” As it is a case of the law actively and intentionally creating a 
lottery to determine legal outcome.  
 
Moreover, Enoch’s distinction between “legal luck” and “plain luck” is 
brittle. For one thing, as Enoch himself concedes, the distinction is 
vague. For instance, considering that different judges sometimes rule 
differently on similar cases, does the fact that judges are often assigned 
cases randomly not suggest that judicial rulings can turn not on one’s 
relevant actions but rather on which judge one was assigned (Waldron 
2008)? In such cases does the law foresee/allow luck to determine legal 
status or does it intend/make it so? It seems unclear. In addition, often 
the distinctions between what the law does or allows and between what 
the law intends or foresees seem mostly a matter of description. At least 
to me, it rings just as true to say that the tort of negligence allows rather 
than makes it so that constitutive luck in one’s natural capacities has 
legal implications. After all, any time a fact affects one’s legal status it 
does so due to the law, as it is always and only law that vests facts with 
legal significance. And whether this is something that the law 
does/allows or intends/foresees often seems mostly due to framing. 
Relatedly, law neither intends nor foresees; neither does law act nor 
allow things to happen, at least not in any straightforward way. The law 
is a system of norms and institutions, and although the law necessarily 
involves people who act, omit, and have mental states, such as intending 
and foreseeing, the law itself is not an agent. Moreover, even when we 
can claim in some sense that law intends or acts – be it through the law’s 
human organs or otherwise – this is surely not true of all laws involving 
luck.  
 
Yet, but for Enoch’s essay, there is a dearth of scholarship on 
delineating the parameters of legal luck. One possible avenue forward is 
to find inspiration in attempts to draw the bounds of moral luck. I will 
close with a suggestion.  
 
Robert Hartman argues that delineating the bounds of moral luck is best 
achieved looking not to the concept of “luck,” but rather to the tension 
in our beliefs out of which the notion of “moral luck” was born 
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(Hartman 2017: 23-31). As Williams and Nagel point out (Williams 
1993; Nagle 1993), on the one hand we believe that people’s moral 
record is not impacted by that which is not under their control. Yet on 
the other hand, purifying moral record from all that is not under one’s 
control entails unintuitive conclusions about our agency and moral 
records. Under Hartman’s approach, the question of moral luck therefore 
arises when this tension manifests – that is, when facts outside of one’s 
control seem, nevertheless, to impact one’s agency and moral record.  
 
When is that the case? According to Barbara Herman not all facts that 
are outside of one’s control – even if influencing one’s actions and/or 
their outcomes – impact moral record. Herman believes that lack of 
control does not influence moral record when the facts outside of one’s 
control are abnormal or irregular (Herman 1995: 147). A view she 
shares with Michael Moore (1997: 211-218). Herman explains that we 
assume a baseline of effective control which includes much that we do 
not control, making normal action – performed against the backdrop of 
that baseline – a matter of course, even though what we control is never 
in and of itself sufficient to effect our ends. According to Herman:   
 
“Whether or not the world cooperates in our efforts is out of our 
control, but it is not a matter of luck, if luck marks the 
introduction of something arbitrary from the moral point of view. 
It is an ordinary component of rational agency that we act on the 
assumption that things are as they seem. That we are not, say, in 
an environment where ordinary causal connections are disrupted 
… Because it is reasonable to trust that normal actions will not 
misfire, we are not lucky when they succeed, even though, as we 
know, there may be a littered field of ‘almost mishaps’ in our 
wake.” (Herman 1995: 147). 
 
Perhaps something similar is true for delineating the breadth of legal 
luck. Possibly it is only when law holds that irregular occurrences – that 
are outside of one’s control – affect one’s legal status, that the 
phenomenon scholars have labelled “legal luck” arises. This would 
explain why, for example, if one’s natural capacities are under the 
reasonable-person standard it seems like a case of constitutive legal 
luck, while the normal case of falling within the standard does not. Or 
why a would-be assassin missing his target due to a mosquito landing on 
his nose – causing him to flinch – seems a case of resultant legal luck, 
while the normal cases in which no mosquito unexpectedly appears to 
save the day are not discussed as involving luck at all. Or why 
proximate causation – turning on foreseeable outcomes – involves far 
less legal luck than the thin skull doctrine which provides for liability 
for unforeseeable outcomes.  
 
Moreover, adopting something like Herman’s approach suggests that in 
cases of legal luck – unlike cases of plain luck – legal status turns on 
luck in facts that do not impact one’s moral record, raising normative 
concerns in cases wherein legal status ought to somehow track moral 
record. Which may explain the possible moral drawback inherent to 
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legal luck, thereby vindicating “legal luck” as a category worthy of 
special moral reflection.  
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 																																																								1	In	adopting	a	control-based	account	of	“luck”	I	follow	the	literature	on	both	“moral	luck”	and	“legal	luck.”		2	The	term	is	Zimmerman’s	(1987).		
